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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS D. KAZDA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14201 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft, a felony 
of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on the 12th and 
13th days of June, 19 75, before the Honorable Gordon 
R. Hall, Judge. Appellant was found guilty of theft 
and sentenced to serve an indeterminant terra of up to 
five years in the Utah State Prison. This sentence is 
to run concurrently with one of the same length which 
appellant is presently serving. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the conviction 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 1, 1974, three men came onto the 
Hogan Ranch, in Tooele County (T. 30,31). The men 
began to cut copper telephone wire from the telephone poles 
(T. 33). Mr. Hogan felt suspicious and called the sheriff 
(T. 32). The sheriff contacted the telephone company 
and learned that no one was authorized to be taking 
down any wire at the Hogan Ranch (T. 59). Telephone 
employees and the sheriff arrived at the scene and the 
three men were arrested (T. 183, 134). The men were 
identified as Dennis Kazda, appellant in this case, Max 
Stockton and Max Reay (T. 170). All of the above is 
undisputed. 
Another fact, however, was strongly disputed. 
Appellant testified that he had a contract to remove 
the wire (T. 176). Appellant claimed that he met a 
Mr. Johnson who represented himself as an employee of 
the telephone company (T. 173,174). Appellant further , 
claims that this Mr. Johnson agreed to pay him for 
removing wire from telephone poles (T. 175) . 
It is very interesting that appellant related 
that he and this Mr. Johnson went to the ranch on 
September 26th so Mr. Johnson could show him which 
lines to take down (T. 172). On that day a ranch 
employee, Mr. Degelbeck, saw appellant and another man 
drive up to the ranch and stop (T. 17). Degelbeck was 
only twenty-five yards from the men who got out of 
their truck (T. 212). From that short distance Degel-
beck could see appellant and the man who appellant 
swears was Mr. Johnson (T. 172). However, significantly, 
Mr. Degelbeck identified the second individual not as 
Mr. Johnson, but as Max Reay, a codefendant of appellants 
(T. 213). 
Mr. Degelbeck"s identification of Reay is 
corroborated by the fact that Mr. Degelbeck said that 
the man had a limp (T. 18). One month later at the 
preliminary hearing Mr. Degelbeck again saw Mr. Reay 
and testified that he limped at that time also (T. 216). 
Furthermore, the sheriff who arrested Reay testified 
that Reay complained about his foot and had a light 
cast on it (T. 115). It seems that the only significant 
question of fact for the jury was whether or not Mr. 
Johnson and the contract ever existed. 
POINT I 
ON APPEAL, APPELLANT MAY NOT CHARGE AS ERROR 
THE TRIAL COURTfS FAILURE TO GIVE A CERTAIN INSTRUCTION 
WHEN APPELLANT NEITHER REQUESTED THE INSTRUCTION NOR 
CALLED THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO ITS OMISSION. 
, t 
I 
Appellant alleges that the trial court 
committed error in that it failed to give an instruc-
tion concerning the defense of "Mistake - of-fact." 
Appellant cites State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 
952 (1936), and other cases in support of the proposi-
tion that when a court fails to instruct on a certain 
point, and no timely exception is taken, in certain 
circumstances the Supreme Court may consider the 
alleged error on appeal. Respondent contends that 
appellant misconstrues the holding of Cobo and the 
law in Utah. It is true that the Supreme Court may, 
under special circumstances, consider the fact that 
a trial court gave erroneous instructions even though 
no timely exception was taken, and that notice may be 
taken when requested instructions are denied. Respon-
dent, however, submits that when a certain instruction 
was neither requested nor called to the attention of the 
court, the rule in Utah is that the unchallenged fail-
ure to give it will not be noticed on appeal. 
In State v. Cobo, supra, the trial court gave 
a certain instruction to the jury which was incorrect 
and prejudicial. The defendant, however, failed to 
object to the instruction. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Utah noted the error anyway and reversed the conviction. 
Therefore, Cobo is no authority for appellant in the 
instant case* There is a great difference between 
giving an erroneous instruction as in Cobo, and not 
giving an unrequested instruction as in the instant 
case. This distinction was pointed out and clarified 
in the later case, State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 
P.2d 504, 507 (1952), wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
"We have held that where 
instructions are palpably erroneous . . . 
we may notice the error without 
exception having been taken. State 
v,Cobo . . . . But, we are aware 
of no holding that the mere failure 
to give an instruction which might 
have been given but which was not 
requested or called to the attention 
2JL the court, and no exception taken 
to the failure to give it, will be 
noticed on appeal." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court made the same statement in State 
v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354, 360 (1940), but 
also added: 
"Having approved the instructions 
as given and requested no others, counsel 
should not be heard to complain that the 
Court did not constitute itself counsel 
in the cause, and submit other theories 
not urged by the defendant . . . . It 
is the court's duty to try the issues . . . 
and not to make the case for them." 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the 
Utah position. The Washington Supreme Court said: 
"Misdirection may be error, but 
nondirection, in the absence of a 
request, is never error." State v. 
Myers, 53 Wash.2d 446, 334 P.2d 
536, 539 (1959). 
The Supreme Court of Idaho said: 
"If the appellant desired 
further instructions on a parti-
cular point it was his duty to 
request them. . .and in the absence 
of such request error cannot be 
assigned." State v. Kelly, 95 
Idaho 851, 521 P.2d 1150 (1974). 
See also holdings from Arizona, State v. Taylor, 109 
Ariz. 481, 512 P.2d 590 (1973), and Montana, State v. 
Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642 (1965). 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellantfs 
Point One, the question of whether the jury should have 
been instructed on the defense of "mistake - in - fact," 
is not properly before this court and should be dis-
missed since appellant neither requested the instruction, 
called it to the attention of the court, nor made timely 
exception to the omission. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COBO RULE WERE TO PROVIDE THAT 
UNREQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS COULD BE NOTICED ON APPEAL, 
THE PRESENT CASE WOULD NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
COBO. 
As demonstrated in point one of this brief, 
the Cobo rule, an exception to the general rule that 
alleged errors will not be considered on appeal unless 
timely exceptions were made, does not comprehend 
the situation of the instant case, an instruction 
was neither given, nor requested or called to the 
attention of the court. However, even if the Cobo 
exception did provide that unrequested instructions could 
be noted on appeal, there are further requirements of 
the Cobo rule which are not met by the facts of the 
instant case. 
The Cobo exception reads, in part, as follows: 
". . .we think that when palpable 
error is made to appear on the face of 
the record . . . to the manifest prejudice 
of the accused . . . ." 60 P.2d at 958. 
Obviously, before the Cobo exception can be used there 
must first be error, and, second, the error must be 
prejudicial to the accused. Case law over the years 
has indicated that even though error is found, if it 
is not prejudicial, the Cobo exception will not be 
used. State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 
(1972), State v. Murphy, 27 Utah 2d 98, 493 P.2d 617 
(1972), and State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 
246 (19 70). Respondent submits that there was no 
error committed by the trial court and if there was, 
that error was not prejudicial to appellant. 
The error claim by appellant is that the 
trial court failed to instruct the jury concerning a 
defense to theft known as "mistake - in - fact." 
It is admitted that the trial court did not use those 
exact words, however, the effect of the instructions 
given was the same as if those words had been used. 
In instruction number twelve the court said: 
"That is, a person acts 
knowingly with respect to a 
result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to deprive 
the owner of property."" 
(Emphasis added.) 
It must be assumed that the jury understood this 
instruction. Therefore, the jury realized that they . 
could not convict appellant if they found that he 
v/as unaware that what he was doing would deprive the 
owner, Mountain Bell, of its property. In other words, 
the jury was informed that they were to acquit if they 
found that appellant mistakenly thought that he had a 
valid contract with Mountain Bell. An added instruc-
tion using the words "mistake - o f - fact" would have 
added nothing to the words "he is aware." It is no 
error to use different words which mean the same thing. 
i < 
Finally, even if there was error in not giving 
the requested instruction, the error was not prejudicial 
to appellant. This is easily demonstrated by the fact 
that of the two codefendants tried together in the 
trial court below, only one, the appellant in this 
case, was convicted. 
As indicated in the facts, appellant claimed 
that he made a contract with a Mr. Johnson to remove 
copper telephone wire (T. 174, 175). Appellant then 
testified that he later hired Mr. Stockton to help him 
remove the wire (T. 192). On cross-examination by 
Mr. Stockton's counsel appellant testified to the cir-
cumstances of his hiring Mr. Stockton. Appellant 
admitted that Stockton was not present when the alleged 
contract was made but only removed wire because of his 
(appellant's) representation that there was a contract 
(T. 192). So appellant's entire defense centered on his 
own claim that Mr. Johnson and the contract did exist. 
Mr. Stockton's entire defense also centered on appel-
lant's claim that Mr. Johnson and the contract did 
exist. The jury found appellant guilty and Stockton 
innocent. Since both removed wire, what was the 
difference? The only logical explanation is that 
I 
the jury found that there was no Mr. Johnson and 
no contract and that appellant was not unaware of 
this, or mistaken - in - fact. At the same time the 
jury found that Mr. Stockton had an honest albeit 
mistaken belief, based on appellant's representation, 
that there was a contract. Thus, even though not 
instructed in exactly those words, the jury con-
sidered the "mistake - in - fact" defense. Therefore, 
even if the court erred by not instructing on 'Mistake -
in - fact/' it is clear that the jury considered that 
defense and the error was not prejudicial. 
In summary, respondent contends that this 
court should not consider appellant's contention that 
the trial court erred in not instructing on the defense 
of "mistake - of - fact" since such an instruction was 
neither requested nor was its absence objected to. 
Respondent further contends that even if this court 
does consider appellant1s contention, it will find 
no error since the "mistake - of - fact" defense 
was included in the jury instruction by the trial 
court, using different words. Respondent finally 
contends that even if the trial court did err in not 
using the words "mistake - of - fact" such error was 
not prejudicial since the jury considered that defense 
anyway in their deliberation. Appellant has not 
I 
carried his burden of proof on appeal and has not 
demonstrated prejudicial error; therefore, the con-
viction should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR BY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "RECKLESS 
INTENT." 
Utah Code Ann. 5 76-2-101 (Supp. 1975), 
states the Utah law on principles of criminal respon-
sibility. That section reads: 
"No person is guilty of an 
offense unless. . . (1) he acts 
intentionally, knowingly, reckless-
l_y, or with criminal negligence. . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1975). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, appellant could have been convicted 
if he acted recklessly in removing the copper telephone 
wires. The trial court instructed on applicable Utah 
law just as it is in the Code. Instruction number 
twelve, which appellant claims was erroneous, simply 
defines the terms "Intentionally," "Knowingly," and 
"Reckless Intent." The court's instructions are 
almost duplicate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (Supp. 
1975), which provides: 
~ i i -
" (1) Intentionally, . . . with 
respect to the nature of his conduct 
or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly. . .with respect 
to his conduct or to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct when he is aware 
of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly. . .with respect to 
a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly . . . with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his con-
duct or the result of his conduct 
when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and justi-
fiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. . ." 
Instruction twelve provided: 
1. "Intentionally" means that with 
respect to the nature of the defendant's 
conduct or a result of his conduct, 
it was the defendant's conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
2. "Knowingly" means that with 
respect to the defendant's conduct or 
circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. 
That is a person acts knowingly with 
respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reason-




3. "Reckless Intent" with respect 
to circumstances surrounding one's conduct 
means conduct which a person is aware of 
but consciously disregards that a 
substantial risk that a person's prop-
erty will be taken unlawfully." 
Since the instructions were identical in meaning 
with the Utah Code and since Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101, 
supra, specifically states that intent can be "reckless," 
there was no error in submitting an instruction to the 
jury on Reckless Intent. Appellant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court may not notice as an 
alleged error on appeal an instruction which was not 
given, when appellant neither requested the instruc-
tion nor objected to its absence. Even if this court 
could notice that type of error, there was no error 
in this case. Also, even if there was error it was 
not prejudicial. Furthermore, the trial court 
committed no error in instructing on reckless intent 
since the Utah Code requires and defines that term 
exactly as given by the trial court. Respondent 
respectfully requests this court to affirm appellant's 
conviction. 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
